An important characteristic of many logics for Arti cial Intelligence is their nonmonotonicity. This means that adding a formula to the premises can invalidate some of the consequences. There may, however, exist formulae that can always be safely added to the premises without destroying any of the consequences: we say they respect monotonicity. Also, there may be formulae that, when they are a consequence, can not be invalidated when adding any formula to the premises: we call them conservative. We study these two classes of formulae for preferential logics, and show that they are closely linked to the formulae whose truth-value is preserved along the (preferential) ordering. We will consider some preferential logics for illustration, and prove syntactic characterization results for them. The results in this paper may improve the e ciency of theorem provers for preferential logics.
Introduction
Over the past decades, many non-classical logics for Arti cial Intelligence have been de ned and investigated. The need for such logics arose from the unsuitability of classical logics to describe defeasible reasoning. These classical logics are monotonic, which means that their consequence relation (j ) satis es:
This means that whenever we learn new information (') and add this to what we already know ( ), all the old theorems ( ) are still derivable. This is clearly undesirable when describing defeasible reasoning. Therefore, monotonicity is not satis ed by many logics for Arti cial Intelligence.
On the other hand, monotonicity is a very attractive feature from a practical point of view. When learning new information, we do not have to start all over again, but we can retain our old conclusions, and focus on deriving possible new ones. Furthermore, when we have a lot of information, we are allowed to focus on only part of it. Conclusions derived from this part are then automatically also valid when considering all the information we have (this is sometimes called local reasoning).
Even though it is clear that we do not want monotonicity to hold in general, it might be worthwhile to investigate restricted variants of monotonicity. In the past, such variants have been de ned which allow us to keep the old theorems, when either the new information follows from the old premise (this variant is called Cautious Monotonicity by Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor, 1990) or its negation can not be derived from the old premise (this is called Rational Monotonicity by Kraus et al., 1990 ). c 1998 AI Access Foundation and Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. All rights reserved.
We will take a somewhat di erent perspective, and consider two classes of formulae: the class of formulae that can always be added to a premise without invalidating old conclusions (we say these formulae respect monotonicity), and the class of formulae which can always be retained as conclusions, no matter which new information is added to the premise (we say these formulae are conservative). The advantages of monotonicity sketched above would still hold when we restrict ' to the class of formulae that respect monotonicity, or when we restrict to be conservative. Whether such classes exist, and what these classes are, depends of course on the particular nonmonotonic logic considered. We will focus here on an important class of nonmonotonic logics: the class of preferential logics (Shoham, 1987 (Shoham, , 1988 . These logics are based on a monotonic logic (such as propositional logic, predicate logic or modal logic) augmented with a preference order on its models. The nonmonotonic consequences of a formula are those formulae which are true in all models of which are minimal in the preference order among all models of (an extensive discussion of preferential logics is provided by van Benthem, 1989) . We will give a formal de nition.
De nition 1 (Preferential logic) A preferential logic consists of a language L, a class of models Mod together with a satisfaction relation j= between models and formulae, and a partial order on Mod. A model m 2 Mod is called a minimal model of a formula (denoted m j= ) if m j= and for all models n, if n m and n j= then n = m. Preferential entailment (j = ) between formulae is de ned as follows: for ; 2 L : j= if is true in all minimal models of .
Our presentation uses a partial order, i.e., a re exive, antisymmetric and transitive relation. Shoham (1987) uses a strict partial order, i.e., an irre exive transitive relation, with a slightly di erent notion of minimal model. The presentations can be translated into each other.
It will turn out that formulae whose truth is preserved when going to more preferred or less preferred models, play an important role with respect to the two classes of formulae de ned above (the class of formulae that respect monotonicity, and the class of conservative formulae). We will rst give a de nition.
In the next section, we will introduce some preferential logics to illustrate the material in the rest of the paper. In Section 3 we will consider formulae that respect monotonicity, and in Section 4 conservative formulae will be treated. The practical implications of the results of this paper are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 gives conclusions and suggestions for further research. Part of the material in this paper appeared in (Engelfriet, 1996b) .
Some Preferential Logics
In this section we will describe the following preferential logics: Ground S5, Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic and Circumscription. Since we have already de ned preferential entailment in general, for each logic we only have to give its ingredients, i.e., L; Mod; j=, and . The preferential entailment relation is then xed by De nition 1. The rst logic we will consider is Ground S5.
Ground S5
Ground S5 is a nonmonotonic modal logic for auto-epistemic reasoning, originally proposed by Halpern and Moses (1985) . Their aim was to formalize statements of the form "I only know '". It allows, for example, to derive that an agent which only knows p, does not know q. Ground S5 falls into the general scheme of ground nonmonotonic modal logics (Donini, Nardi, & Rosati, 1997) . A lot of interest is devoted to logics of minimal knowledge (Levesque, 1990; Schwarz & Truszczy nski, 1994; Chen, 1997; Halpern, 1997) .
Semantically, states in which an agent only knows ', are states in which ' is known, but otherwise the amount of knowledge is minimal. We will use a modal propositional language to express the knowledge of the agent, and S5 will be the monotonic logic. We will give a treatment of Ground S5 slightly di erent, but equivalent to the one given by Halpern and Moses (1985) .
De nition 3 (Epistemic language) Let An example of a subjective formula is :Kp^K(q ! p), whereas K(p^q) _ s is not subjective. In the rest of this paper we will only be interested in subjective formulae: they describe (just) the knowledge and ignorance of the agent.
In the usual S5 semantics, a model is a triple (W; R; ), where W is a set of worlds, R is an equivalence relation on W and is a function that assigns a propositional valuation to each world in W. We may however, in the case of one agent, restrict ourselves to normal S5 models, in which the relation is universal (each world is accessible from every world), and worlds are identi ed with propositional valuations (a proof of soundness and completeness of S5 with respect to these semantics is given by Meyer & van der Hoek, 1995) .
De nition 4 (S5 semantics) Let P be a ( nite or countably in nite) set of propositional atoms. A propositional valuation is a function from P into f0; 1g where 0 stands for false and 1 for true. The set of all such valuations will be denoted by Mod(P) . A normal S5 model M is a non-empty subset of Mod(P). 2. An S5 formula ' is subjective if and only if it is equivalent to a formula of the form K' with ' 2 L S5 . A subjective formula describes the knowledge of an agent, but we want to formalize that this is all the agent knows. Therefore we are looking for models in which the knowledge of the agent is minimal, or in other words, in which the ignorance of the agent is maximal. We introduce a preference order over information states which favors models with less knowledge. The de nition of this ordering is based on the observation that the more valuations the agent considers possible, the less knowledge the agent has. Indeed, for any propositional formula ' we have: if M 1 j= K' and M 1 M 2 then M 2 j= K'.
De nition 6 (Degree of knowledge) We de ne the degree-of-knowledge ordering on normal S5 models as follows: for M 1 ; M 2 2 IS : M 1 M 2 , M 1 M 2 .
Ground S5 is the preferential logic based on this ordering.
De nition 7 (Ground S5) Ground S5 is the preferential logic with the subjective formulae of L S5 as its language, IS as its class of models, the satisfaction relation of Proposition 5 and the ordering of De nition 6. We will denote preferential entailment (as de ned in Let us de ne a consequence relation j by ' j if K' j= GS5 K . Then it turns out that this is the consequence relation of Halpern and Moses (1985) , apart from the fact that they only de ned it for premises which have a unique minimal model. Premises with a unique minimal model are called honest. To give an example, the formula Kp is honest, but Kp _ Kq is not: both the S5 model consisting of all valuations in which p is true, and the model with all valuations in which q is true, are minimal models.
Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic
In Ground S5, we are only able to express something about`all the agent knows' at a particular instant. We will extend this logic in such a way that we are also able to say something about the changing knowledge of the agent over time. Originally, this extended logic was intended as a means of specifying nonmonotonic reasoning processes and of reasoning about their properties (Engelfriet & Treur, 1994 , 1996 Engelfriet, 1996a) . The idea is that a temporal formula describes the nonmonotonic inferences the agent has to perform during the course of a reasoning process (analogously to the use of temporal logic for specifying computer processes). But these inferences should also be the only cause of increases in the agent's knowledge. Therefore, we again have to minimize the agent's knowledge, but now over time (analogously to the use of minimization for dealing with the frame problem in temporal logics for describing action and change, Shoham, 1988) . To this end, we will temporalize the epistemic language, epistemic models and the degree-of-knowledge ordering.
In order to describe past and future we introduce temporal operators P; H; F; G and 2, denoting respectively \sometimes in the past", \always in the past", \sometimes in the future", \always in the future" and \always". We do not want to describe the agent's knowledge of the future and past, but the future and past of the agent's knowledge. Therefore, temporal operators are not allowed to occur within the scope of the epistemic K operator. If in the rst clause we restrict ourselves to subjective formulae, we get the set of subjective TEL formulae.
In the rest of this paper we will be interested in subjective TEL formulae since they describe how the knowledge of the agent is changing over time. Based on the set of natural numbers (N) as ow of time, and normal S5 models as formalization of states in a temporal model, the following semantics is introduced for temporal epistemic logic (TEL): Note that the above de nition is in principle ambiguous: a formula like Kp^Kq is an S5 formula which can be interpreted according to the rst semantic clause, but it can also be seen as a conjunction, to be interpreted according to the second clause. As the interpretation of the conjunction (and the same holds for negation) is the same in S5 as in TEL, this ambiguity is harmless.
We will brie y explain the reason we have de ned M j= ' if (M; 0) j= '. Later on, we will make the general assumption on preferential logics that the language contains negation, and that m j= :' if and only if m 6 j= ' (Assumption 1). If we de ne M j= ' if (M; t) j= ' for all t 2 N, then this assumption would not hold for TEL. The two de nitions can be translated into each other, since (M; 0) j= ' if and only if (M; t) j= :P > ! ' for all t 2 N and (M; t) j= ' for all t 2 N if and only if (M; 0) j= '^G'. This is also one of the reasons we gave a slightly di erent presentation of Ground S5 (using subjective formulae).
In conservative models, the propositional knowledge of an agent can only increase in time. We will restrict ourselves to these models, i.e., an agent can not forget or revise its (propositional) knowledge. Indeed, for a propositional formula ' and a TELC model M , if (M; t) j= K' then (M; s) j= K' for all s > t. This restriction can be made when the agent is reasoning about a xed (non-changing) situation, and we are abstracting from particular implementation details (such as the use of backtracking implementations for nonmonotonic logics). We now extend the ordering and minimal consequence relation to TELC models. The ordering is extended in a pointwise fashion.
De nition 10 (Minimal temporal epistemic logic) 1. We extend the degree-of-knowledge ordering to TELC models by de ning The idea behind using MTEL for specifying reasoning processes is that a subjective TEL formula ' describes the reasoning of an agent over time (it can, for example, describe the use of nonmonotonic inference rules, see Proposition 11). The minimal models of ' represent the process of the agent reasoning in time. We can then use minimal consequence to infer properties of this reasoning process.
It is easy to see that MTEL is a generalization of Ground S5: for subjective S5 formulae '; we have that ' j= MTEL if and only if ' j= GS5 . As an example of the use of the notion of minimal temporal epistemic consequence, it has been shown by Engelfriet and Treur (1993) that it can capture default logic (Reiter, 1980b) . 
Circumscription
One of the earliest approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning is circumscription (McCarthy, 1977 (McCarthy, , 1980 Davis, 1980; Lifschitz, 1994; Etherington, 1988) , a preferential logic based on rst-order predicate logic. The main idea behind circumscription is a kind of completeness of information given to us: \the premises as stated give us`the whole truth' about the matter" (van Benthem, 1989) . This leads to at least two kinds of minimality: predicateminimality and domain-minimality. The intuition behind predicate-minimality is that for some relevant property (predicate), all objects that have this property, are explicitly said to have this property in the premise. This allows us to formulate defaults stating that all normal objects have some property. Minimizing abnormality will allow us to conclude an object has this property, unless we can deduce from the premise that this object is abnormal. The intuition behind domain-minimality, is that the domain (of discourse) contains no other objects than those that can be deduced to exist from the premise. (This intuition is strongly tied to the domain-closure assumption of Reiter, 1980a) . These two kinds of minimality are formalized by two variants of Circumscription. Both of them will be treated below.
The classical logic underlying circumscription is rst-order predicate logic. We assume a standard rst-order language L with a nite number of predicate symbols, including equality. We will also assume that the language contains no function or constant symbols. This is not a severe limitation, since we can eliminate function and constant symbols by introducing new predicate symbols (Davis, 1980) . We will rst give the de nition of the orderings and then de ne predicate and domain circumscriptive consequence.
De nition 12 1. Let P be a predicate symbol in the language L. For a structure M for the language, P M denotes the interpretation of P in M (so P M is a subset of dom(M) n , where dom(M) is the domain of M, and n is the arity of P). For two structures M; N, we say M is P-preferred to N, denoted M P N, if they have the same domain, the same interpretation of predicate symbols other than P, and P M P N . Predicate circumscription of P is the preferential logic which uses rst-order predicate logic for the language, models and satisfaction relation, augmented with the ordering P . We will denote preferential entailment (as de ned We refer the reader to the references given above for standard results and motivation of circumscription.
Respecting Monotonicity
In this section we will study formulae which respect monotonicity. We will rst give a formal de nition.
De nition 13 (Respecting monotonicity) Given a preferential logic, we say a formula ' respects monotonicity, if 8 ; : j= ) ^' j= : Next, we will make some basic assumptions about the (underlying logic of the) preferential logic.
Assumption 1 From now on we will assume that any preferential logic satis es the following: the language has conjunction (^) and m j= '^ , m j= ' and m j= . the language has implication (!) and m j= ' ! , m 6 j= ' or m j= . the language has negation (:) and m j= :' , m 6 j= '.
We can then immediately identify a class of formulae that respect monotonicity: Proposition 14 Downward persistent formulae respect monotonicity.
Proof: Suppose ' is downward persistent. Let ; be formulae and suppose j= . Let m be a minimal model of ^'. Then it is also a minimal model of . For suppose it is not, then there exists n m, n 6 = m and n j= . Since m j= ' and ' is downward persistent, we have n j= '. But then n j= ^' which contradicts the assumption that m was a minimal model of ^'. Since m is a minimal model of and j= , we have m j= . We have proved that ^' j= . Thus, ' respects monotonicity. 2
Of course, valid and unsatis able sentences are downward persistent. But the question is whether non-trivial downward persistent formulae exist. For the preferential logics introduced in Section 2, the answer is a rmative.
De nition 15 (DIAM) De ne the class of S5 formulae DIAM by:
where ' is propositional.
Formulae from DIAM essentially only contain the M operator (the`diamond' of S5, and not the`box' operator K). Formulae in this class are the only subjective formulae (up to equivalence) which are downward persistent in Ground S5 (this was proved by Engelfriet, 1996a TD stands for`temporal diamond' formulae. The following was also proved by Engelfriet (1996a) .
Theorem 18 In MTEL, a formula ' is downward persistent if and only if it is equivalent (in the sense of ) to a formula in TD.
As in the case of Ground S5, these formulae express (temporal) ignorance of the agent.
De nition 19 (Positive and universal formulae) A rst-order predicate formula is negative in a predicate P, if all occurrences of the predicate P are in the scope of an odd number of negations. A formula is universal if it is of the form 8x 1 : : : x n where is quanti er free.
The following result links these formulae to downward persistence in circumscription. The rst is a variant of Lyndon's theorem and is folklore (we leave the details to the reader); the second result is known as the Lo s-Tarski theorem (Chang & Keisler, 1990 So downward persistent formulae in predicate circumscription essentially only say something about elements not having property P (besides the other properties they mention), and downward persistent formulae in domain circumscription essentially only mention universal properties (and do not say anything about the existence of objects).
For our examples, we have shown that non-trivial classes of formulae that respect monotonicity exist. The question is whether there are more such formulae, besides those that are downward persistent. We will give a criterion that ensures that there are no more formulae that respect monotonicity.
De nition 21 (Expressibility of preference) A preferential logic satis es expressibility of preference if the following holds: 8m 2 Mod : 9' m 2 L : 8n 2 Mod : (n j= ' m , m n): The formula ' m expresses: \I am less preferred than m," and describes exactly those models which are larger in the preferential ordering. The criterion of expressibility of preference poses a requirement on the expressiveness of the language, given its semantics. We will prove that in preferential logics that satisfy the condition in this de nition, the downward persistent formulae are the only ones that respect monotonicity. The above condition can be generalized by taking into account equivalent models; we have not done this immediately as it makes things rather cumbersome. If whenever n m and m k (where m k means that m and k satisfy the same formulae), there exists a model l such that l n and l k, then we can generalize the condition to: 8m 2 Mod : 9' m 2 L : 8n 2 Mod : (n j= ' m , 9k 2 Mod : m k & k n).
Theorem 22 (Only if : : : ) For a preferential logic that satis es expressibility of preference we have: if a formula respect monotonicity, then it is downward persistent.
Proof: Suppose a formula ' is not downward persistent, then there exist models m and n such that m j= ', n 6 j= ' and n m. De ne = ' n^( ' ! ' m ) and = :'. First we claim that j= . Since n n, we have n j= ' n , and as n 6 j= ' we get n j= . Furthermore, for any model k, if k j= then in particular k j= ' n so n k. Therefore, n is the only minimal model of , and since n 6 j= ', we have n j= . On the other hand, ^' 6 j= : n m so m j= ' n and m m so m j= ' m from which we conclude that m j= so m j= ^'. Furthermore, for any model k, if k j= ^', then k j= ' and k j= ' ! ' m so k j= ' m . From this it follows that m k, but this means that m is a (actually, the only) minimal model of ^' and m j= ' so m 6 j= . We conclude that ' does not respect monotonicity, since we have found formulae and such that j= but ^' 6 j= . 2
It may seem that the condition of expressibility of preference is too restrictive. However, we will see that it is useful for the examples.
Proposition 23 For Ground S5, MTEL and nite predicate and domain circumscription, only downward persistent formulae respect monotonicity.
Proof: Remark that all of these logics satisfy Assumption 1. First consider Ground S5.
Let us rst take the language to be nite (that is, P is nite). Take any S5 model M.
For each propositional valuation m, de ne the formula m by m = V fp 2 P j m j= pg^Vf:p j p 2 P; m 6 j= pg. This is a well-de ned formula since P is nite. Now construct ' M = V fK(: m ) j m = 2 Mg, which is again a well-de ned formula since Mod(P) is nite. It can easily be seen that any S5 model N satis es ' M if and only if M N. So expressibility of preference is satis ed, whence Theorem 22 ensures that only downward persistent formulae respect monotonicity for this nite language. Now let P be arbitrary, and suppose ' in this language respects monotonicity. Then it is easy to see that if we restrict the language to atoms occurring in ', it still respects monotonicity, so it is downward persistent in the restricted language. It follows easily that ' is also downward persistent in the full language.
For MTEL, the same considerations make it su cient to give a formula ' M for a nite language only, so let us take P nite. Then every S5 model M(i) is a nite set of propositional valuations. Since the sequence fM(i)g is decreasing with respect to set-inclusion (as M is conservative), there will be an index k such that M(j) = M(k) for all j > k.
To improve readability of the formula ' M we de ne the formulae at i to be P i >^H i+1 ? (where P i stands for a sequence of P operators of length i). It is easy to see that for any model N For nite circumscription, we need the more general de nition of expressibility of preference hinted at before (in rst-order logic, there may be equivalent models: di erent models that satisfy the same rst-order formulae). Here we need not restrict the language. In predicate circumscription, the required formula ' M for a nite structure M expresses: (i) the exact number of elements of the domain of M, (ii) for which of these elements P holds, and (iii) for all other predicates Q it expresses for which elements Q holds, and for which its negation holds. In domain circumscription, the required formula ' M for a nite structure M expresses the fact that there are (at least) as many elements as in M, and for each predicate Q, it expresses for which of these elements Q holds, and for which elements its negation holds.
2
It is not possible to nd the required formula ' M in (non-nite) circumscription in general: for in nite structures we are not in general able to express the number of elements, and we can not describe the entire extensions of predicates in general. Indeed, the above result does not hold for domain circumscription. It is still an open question whether it holds for predicate circumscription.
Proposition 24 For domain circumscription, there exists a rst-order predicate formula which respects monotonicity but is not downward persistent.
Proof: Consider the rst-order language L = f<; =g, and let ' be a sentence stating that < is a dense linear ordering without begin-or endpoint. This is a complete theory (Rabin, 1977 2 Until now we have considered formulae that can be added to any premise, but we can also ask the question whether a formula respects monotonicity for a given, xed premise. Proof: The right to left direction is trivial (and does not depend on the assumption). For the other direction, suppose that 8 ( j= ) ^' j= ). Let m 2 Mod be arbitrary and suppose m j= ^'. Now de ne = W f n j n j= g; this is a well-de ned formula since Mod was assumed nite. It is easy to see that j= : suppose n j= , then n is one of the disjuncts of , and by de nition of n , we have n j= n , so n j= . But the assumption now gives that ^' j= . As m j= ^', we have m j= , so there is an n 2 Mod with n j= and m j= n . But by de nition of n this means that m = n so m j= . 2
Proposition 25 states that a formula ' respects monotonicity for a xed premise if and only if the minimal models of ^' are minimal models of . Of course the criterion on the right-hand side is hard to check; we can give another criterion, but for that, we rst need the following de nition (Kraus et al., 1990 This condition, which is also called stopperedness or well-foundedness, and is akin to the limit assumption (Lewis, 1973) , forbids chains of ever-decreasing models satisfying a formula. It is one of the basic properties in the framework of Kraus et al. (1990) .
Proposition 27 Given a smooth preferential logic, we have: 8m 2 Mod(m j= ^' ) m j= ) if and only if 8m 2 Mod(m j= ^' ) 9n 2 Mod(n m; n j= and n j= ')).
The proof of this proposition is straightforward, and again it may not help much. As far as the examples are concerned, the conclusion of Proposition 25 holds for both Ground S5 and MTEL (the properties depend only on and ' so we may restrict the signature and then use the proposition). Proposition 27 holds for Ground S5 (which is smooth). From these propositions we can nd some su cient conditions. If ' is downward persistent in the models of , then Proposition 25 ensures that ' respects monotonicity with respect to . If j= ' then Proposition 27 ensures that ' respects monotonicity with respect to (but this also follows immediately with the rule of Cautious Monotonicity, which is satis ed in smooth preferential logics, Kraus et al., 1990) . It seems hard to nd a simple criterion necessary and su cient for respecting monotonicity for a given premise. We leave this for further research.
Conservativity
In the previous section we have considered formulae that can always be added to a premise without invalidating any of the conclusions. In this section we will focus on the conclusions, and study formulae that, when they are concluded, can always be kept, no matter which new information is added to the premise. We will call these formulae conservative.
De nition 28 (Conservative) Given a preferential logic, we say a formula is conservative, if 8 ; ' : j= ) ^' j= : We have the following result connecting upward persistent and conservative formulae, in analogy with Proposition 14.
Proposition 29 Given a preferential logic that is smooth, if a formula is upward persistent, it is conservative. Proof: Let be upward persistent in a smooth preferential logic. Now suppose j= .
Take any model m such that m j= ^', then m j= so by smoothness, there is a model n with n m and n j= . Then, as j= , we have n j= . Since n m and is upward persistent, we have m j= . This shows that ^' j= , so is conservative. 2 Again, we can ask if the upward persistent formulae are the only conservative formulae, and this is true under the same conditions as in the case of respecting monotonicity.
Proposition 30 (Only if : : : ) For a preferential logic that satis es expressibility of preference we have: if a formula is conservative, then it is upward persistent.
Proof: Suppose is not upward persistent, then there are n; m 2 Mod such that n m, and n j= but m 6 j= . Now take = ' n and ' = ' m . Then n is the only minimal model of and n j= so j= , but m is a (actually, the only one) minimal model of ^', and m 6 j= , so ^' 6 j= . Thus, is not conservative. 2
Let us rst identify the upward persistent formulae for our examples. This is relatively straightforward, since we have the following elementary result. Then a subjective S5 formula ' is upward persistent in Ground S5 if and only if it is S5-equivalent to a formula in BOX.
2. De ne TB ::= BOX j TB^TB j TB _ TB j F(TB) j G(TB) j P(TB) j H(TB). Then a subjective TEL formula ' is upward persistent in MTEL if and only if it is equivalent (in the sense of ) to a formula in TB.
3. A rst-order formula is upward persistent in predicate circumscription (of P) if and only if it is equivalent to a formula that is positive in P (meaning that all occurrences of the predicate P are in the scope of an even number of negations). A rst-order formula is upward persistent in domain circumscription if and only if it is equivalent to an existential formula (a formula of the form 9x 1 : : : x n where is quanti er free).
Proof: Straightforward.
2
In the above de nition, formulae from BOX essentially only contain the K operator (thè box' of S5); TB stands for`temporal box' formulae. Now let us see what Propositions 29 and 30 say about the examples. Ground S5 satis es expressibility of preference (for a nite language) and is smooth, so the conservative formulae are exactly the upward persistent formulae, which express only knowledge (and not ignorance). This can be lifted again to an in nite language. The fact that in Ground S5, formulae that express propositional knowledge, are conservative, was already noted by Donini et al. (1997) . MTEL also satis es expressibility of preference (for a nite language), so any formula that is conservative, must be upward persistent, and must be equivalent to a formula in TB, expressing knowledge over time (not ignorance). This can be lifted to an in nite language. Unfortunately, MTEL is not smooth: the formula F(Kp) is satis able, but has no minimal model. In MTEL, we have that F(Kp) j= MTEL F(Kq), but F(Kp)^Kp 6 j= MTEL F(Kq) (F (Kp)^Kp has a minimal model, in which only p is known, from the rst point in time onwards). This means that the formula F(Kq) is not conservative, although it is upward persistent. It is easy to see that in any preferential logic, valid formulae are always conservative, but in MTEL, these are (almost) the only ones.
De nition 33 We call a TEL model M totally ignorant, if for all propositional formulae ' we have: if M j= F(K') then ' is a propositional tautology. De ne the totally ignorant model M ti by M ti (i) = Mod(P) for all i.
In a totally ignorant model, no knowledge is ever gained. The totally ignorant model is certainly a totally ignorant model, and if P is nite, it is the only one.
Proposition 34 For MTEL, in case P is in nite, we have that a formula is conservative if and only if it is true in all models. When P is nite, a formula is conservative if and only if it is true in all models except possibly the totally ignorant model.
Proof: We will prove that is conservative if and only if it is true in all models that are not totally ignorant (both when P is nite and when it is in nite). First, suppose M is a model that is not totally ignorant, in which is not true. So M j= F(K ) for some propositional formula that is not a propositional tautology. If P is nite, we can consider the formula ' M (see the proof of Proposition 23 for the de nition of ' M ). If P is in nite, one can show that M can be chosen in such a way that it is a`inherently nite' model, allowing the construction of a formula ' M with the same properties as for the case when P is nite (using essentially the same construction). The details of this argument are left to the reader. The formula F(K ) does not have a minimal model ( must be known sometimes in the future, but this moment can always be postponed, yielding a smaller model), so F(K ) j= MTEL .
On the other hand, it can easily be shown that the only minimal model of F(K )^' M is M , which gives us F(K )^' M 6 j= MTEL . This means that is not conservative. Now suppose that is true in all models that are not totally ignorant, and suppose j= MTEL . Let M be a minimal model of ^'. If M is not totally ignorant, then M j= . If it is totally ignorant, then also M ti j= ^' (it can be shown by induction that all totally ignorant models satisfy the same formulae). But then M ti j= . Since no model is preferred over M ti , this means that M ti j= so M ti j= , whence M j= . It follows that ^' j= MTEL , so is conservative. Let us look at the case when P is in nite. Suppose M 6 j= , with M totally ignorant. Now take a propositional atom p not occurring in . It can easily be shown that we can nd a model of Kp in which is not satis ed. This model is of course not totally ignorant. This shows that if is true in all models that are not totally ignorant, then it is true in all models. In case P is nite, M ti is the only totally ignorant model. 2
So in MTEL with an in nite P, valid formulae are the only conservative formulae. These formulae are of course upward persistent (in a trivial way), and they are equivalent to a formula in TB, for instance K(>). When the signature is nite, there are some extra formulae that are conservative, for example if P = fp; qg, then the formula F(K(p _ q) _ K(:p _ q) _ K(p _ :q) _ K(:p _ :q)) is also conservative (it is true in all models except the totally ignorant one). Of course, this formula is upward persistent, and it is in TB.
Finite predicate and domain circumscription satisfy both expressibility of preference and smoothness, so the conservative formulae coincide with the upward persistent formulae which have the syntactic characterization of Proposition 32.
Full circumscription satis es neither of the conditions.
Proposition 35 In predicate and domain circumscription there are upward persistent formulae that are not conservative.
Proof: First consider predicate circumscription. Let the language consist of three predicates besides equality, namely P, Succ and < (and P is circumscribed). De ne the formulae and ' as follows: = 8x9!y(Succ(x; y))^' = 8xy(P x^Succ(y; x) ! Py) 8x9!y(Succ(y; x))8 xy(Succ(x; y) ! x < y)8 xyz(x < y^y < z ! x < z)8 x(:(x < x))8 xy(x < y _ y < x _ x = y)9 xPx 8xy(P x^Succ(x; y) ! Py) The intuitive meaning of is that there are Succ-chains of elements, extending inde nitely in both directions. If P occurs somewhere on such a chain, it must be true in all successors as well. A model of can be made smaller (more preferred) by making P false in a point and all of its predecessors (leaving it true in all successors). We will now make this argument formal. The rst claim is that has no P -minimal models. Let M be a model of . Then there must be an x 2 dom(M) with x 2 P M . De ne A = fxg fy 2 P M j (y; x) 2< M g. Let N be the structure with the same domain as M, the same extension of Succ and <, and P N = P M n A. It is straightforward to verify that N is a model of , and that N P M and N 6 = M.
On the other hand, ^' has minimal models. Let M be the structure with dom(M) = Z (the integers), (a; b) 2 Succ M , b = a + 1, (a; b) 2< M , a < b in the natural ordering on the integers, and P M = Z. It can easily be checked that M j= ^'. Now suppose N P M, N 6 = M and N j= ^'. This means that P N Z (strict inclusion), and P N 6 = ; (as N j= 9xP x). But then there must be x; y 2 Z with y = x + 1, and either x 2 P N and y = 2 P N , or x = 2 P N and y 2 P N , contradicting either N j= 8xy(P x^Succ(x; y) ! Py) (N j= ) or N j= '. Therefore M is a minimal model of ^'. Now de ne = 9x(x 6 = x), which is trivially upward persistent. Since has no minimal models, we have j= PC P , but M 6 j= , so ^' 6 j= PC P . This shows that is not conservative.
For domain circumscription, the example is quite similar. Again take = 9x(x 6 = x). Now de ne the formulae and ' as follows: = 8x9!y(Succ(x; y))^' = 8y9x(Succ(x; y)) 8xy(Succ(x; y) ! x < y)8 xyz(x < y^y < z ! x < z)8 x(:(x < x))8 xy(x < y _ y < x _ x = y)8 xyz(Succ(x; z)^Succ(y; z) ! x = y) One can now check that has no d -minimal models, but ^' does, so the same is upward persistent but not conservative in domain circumscription. The details are left to the reader. 2
Note that the condition j= was not used in the proof; if 6 j= the equivalence is still true, as both sides are false. The proposition shows that the monotonic consequences of a premise are the only ones conservative with respect to this xed premise.
Corollary 37 Let be a conservative formula for a preferential logic that satis es expressibility of preference, then j= , j= .
Proof: If j= then in any preferential logic it follows that j= . On the other hand, if j= , then for any ' we have ^' j= , since is conservative. With Proposition 36 it follows that j= .
In the last two sections, we have derived a number of results on formulae that respect monotonicity and conservative formulae and the links with persistent formulae. In the next section we will discuss the impact of these results in practice.
Practical Implications
The results in this paper may improve the e ciency of theorem provers for preferential logics, depending on a number of factors. In the rst place, it is important how the theorem prover is used.
Consider the situation where we have a stand-alone theorem prover which gets di erent (unrelated) queries. Furthermore, suppose the theorem prover is asked to prove 1^: : :^ n j= . Then there are at least two possibilities for using the results in the paper. First of all, suppose the preferential logic satis es expressibility of preference. Then if is upward persistent, we do not have to prove 1^: : :^ n j= , as it is equivalent to prove 1^: : :^ n j= (Corollary 37). In most preferential logics, preferential entailment is harder to compute than entailment in the underlying logic.
In the second place, sometimes local reasoning is possible (which is not possible in general for non-monotonic logics): the theorem prover may derive the conclusion from part of the premise. So it may be the case that there is a 1 k < n such that 1^: : :^ k j= which is easier to verify than the original query. Then if k+1 ; : : : ; n are downward persistent, Proposition 14 implies that 1^: : :^ n j= . If is upward persistent (and the preferential logic is smooth), Proposition 29 sanctions 1^: : :^ n j= . For these results to be usable in a theorem prover, we need heuristic knowledge to decide if there is a promising split of the premise into two parts A and B. For such a split, we can then try to prove A j= and downward persistence of B or upward persistence of . In case 1^: : :^ k j= can not be proved, we may have to directly prove 1^: : :^ n j= after all.
These two methods will of course only improve e ciency if the determination of persistence is easier than the original query (we will treat this question below).
The second kind of situation is when we have a theorem prover which is used by an agent which has a lot of knowledge about the world, and from time to time performs observations to increase its knowledge. Then, although sometimes the agent will need to perform revisions, we are often in the situation that (many) conclusions from a premise ( ) have been proved, and the premise is augmented by a new formula ('). If this new formula is downward persistent, then the agent can retain all the old conclusions (and may only need to derive some new conclusions). If it is not, it can at least retain all the upward persistent conclusions (if the preferential logic is smooth). We may also try to determine if ' is downward persistent given , or if is conservative given . Again, these methods only improve e ciency if it is easier to determine if ' respects monotonicity (possibly given ) than recomputing all old conclusions, or if it is easier to determine that is conservative (possibly given ) than checking ^' j= .
The possible e ciency improvement in both cases heavily depends on the cost of determining persistence relative to the cost of determining preferential consequence. Unfortunately, it is very hard to say anything about this issue in general. It depends on the preferential logic at hand, on the representation of the logic (syntactically, as a proof calculus, or semantically, as models with a preference relation), and on other implementation issues. For instance, it can be important how much information is retained from previous queries: whether proofs or minimal models are stored. Let us consider the examples again.
Preferential entailment in both Ground S5 and MTEL is Q P 3 -complete (Engelfriet, 1996a) , whereas full circumscription is undecidable (restricted versions of circumscription exist which are decidable, but still highly complex). Unfortunately, determining downward or upward persistence is not easier for these logics. We have seen that the classes of persistent formulae have syntactic representations of the form: ' is upward/downward persistent if and only if it is equivalent to a formula in C, where C is a (syntactic) class of formulae. Now, of course, determining equivalence to a formula in C is as complex as determining persistence, but there may be subclasses of a class of persistent formulae, with a lower complexity. For instance, determining membership of C is much easier, namely polynomial. The members of C are persistent. So what we propose is to check membership of C, instead of equivalence to a member of C. In that case, we will miss some persistent formulae (and have to prove the original query), but this disadvantage is outweighed by the complexity advantage of checking membership. The checking of membership can be improved upon by adding some (easy) checks for equivalence to a formula in C. For instance, in Ground S5, if we consider, for a formula ', for each propositional sub-formula, the nearest K operator in which scope it lies, then if all of these K operators are in the scope of an odd number of negations, we can conclude that ' is downward persistent. The formula :K(q _ Kp), for example, satis es this condition, and although it is not a member of DIAM, it is equivalent to :Kq^:Kp 2 DIAM. This check is obviously polynomial.
Given a preferential logic, the designer of a theorem prover could proceed as follows. First, syntactic classes of formulae that are downward and upward persistent have to be identi ed. For Ground S5, MTEL and predicate and domain circumscription, these can be found in De nitions 15, 17, 19 and Proposition 32. For other preferential logics, if such classes are trivial (they may, for instance, only include tautologies and contradictions), then the usefulness of the results is limited. Otherwise, the theorem prover could work as follows. Given a query of the form ^' j= , rst it is checked if ' belongs to the syntactic class of downward persistent formulae or if belongs to the syntactic class of upward persistent formulae (this latter test should only be performed if the preferential logic is smooth). If is conservative and the logic satis es expressibility of preference, it tries to prove ^' j= (this usually has a lower complexity than the original query; for Ground S5 and MTEL, monotonic consequence is NP-complete, Engelfriet, 1996a) . The answer of this query is the answer to the original query (see Corollary 37). Otherwise, if ' belongs to the syntactic class of downward persistent formulae or if belongs to the syntactic class of upward persistent formulae (but the logic does not satisfy expressibility of preference), then the theorem prover tries to prove j= . If this succeeds, it outputs yes. Otherwise, it will try to answer the original query directly.
As stated before, the practical savings in part depend on representation and implementation aspects. It also depends on the application domain and use of the theorem prover: if formulae in these syntactic classes occur often, the e ciency improvement is higher than if they are infrequent.
Conclusions and Further Research
We have looked at restrictions of monotonicity in preferential logics. While monotonicity does not hold in general, we can identify (in general non-trivial) classes of formulae for which restricted versions of monotonicity holds. This may make (nonmonotonic) deduction in preferential logics easier, since we may sometimes keep conclusions, or identify which conclusions may be kept, when adding new information to a premise. The results in this paper may lead to more e cient implementations of preferential logics. Experimenting with theorem provers which use these results is necessary in order to determine the e ciency improvement in practice.
It would be nice to nd a better characterization of formulae that can be added to a given, xed premise without destroying conclusions.
Syntactic characterizations of persistent formulae were given for a number of example preferential logics, but we would like to have a result for broader classes of preferential logics, such as the class of ground nonmonotonic modal logics (Donini et al., 1997) . ument. Furthermore, I would like to thank Heinrich Herre for suggesting the example in Proposition 24. The anonymous referees helped to improve the paper.
